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Professor Bork on Vertical Price Fixing:
A Rejoinder
J. R. Gouldt and B. S. Yamey*
Professor Bork's Reply' to our earlier Note2 on his original ArticleO
raises a number of new issues and reveals some misunderstanding of
what we set out to do in our paper. In this Rejoinder we shall address
ourselves to the new issues raised and shall clarify our position. The
discussion follows the sequence of our earlier paper and of Bork's
Reply. But first two general matters require attention.
First, Bork writes as though we put forward a specific policy recom-
mendation concerning resale price maintenance (r.p.m.) (references to
which in this Rejoinder, unless otherwise qualified, are to r.p.m. in the
absence of manufacturer and reseller cartels). Thus he says we "recom-
mend a rule against all r.p.m. because r.p.m. may restrict output."4 The
reader will not find such a policy prescription (or, indeed, any policy
prescription) in our paper, which was concerned primarily with the
reasoning behind Bork's policy recommendations. In the introduction
to our Note we said that we found Bork's thesis interesting because it
claimed that in a wide class of cases r.p.m. could not fail to benefit
consumers. If this contention were true, it would have important im-
plications for public policy: courts or other agencies could be spared
the task of evaluating, case by case, the economic effects of the practice,
and would instead have to decide only whether in the particular case
r.p.m. was an instrument of a cartel.
Wide generalizations with important implications are to be wel-
comed in any science-if they are true. The predominant purpose of
our Note was to refute Bork's generalization. In a short Note devoted
mainly to refuting his proposition we did not feel called upon to pre-
sent an empirical evaluation of the gains and losses of an anti-r.p.m.
policy (as Bork suggested we ought to have done)." Bork had attempted
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1. Bork, A Reply to Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 YALE L.J. 731 (1967).
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3. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Di.
vision II, 75 YALE LJ. 373 (1966).
4. Bork, supra note I, at 742.
5. Mork displays a complete misunderstanding of the scope and purpose of our Note
when he says (id. 732):
Since Gould and Yamey think ... r.pm.... may either increase or decrease output,
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to close a large area of the debate on r.p.m.-our concern was to show
that he had failed to do so.
In this Note we shall therefore not deal with those points raised in
Bork's Reply which stem from his erroneous attribution of a definite
policy prescription to our paper. Bork's misunderstanding may have
arisen from our statement that certain specified considerations "set up
a presumption that r.p.m. is against the interests of consumers."O He
may have thought that we had in mind an irrebuttable presumption.
We did not; if we had had this in mind, we would have said so.
The second general point has serious consequences for Bork's posi-
tion. At several places in his Reply, Bork deals with certain of our
arguments by counter-arguing, in effect, that if the situations postu-
lated by us were to occur, they would not persist because of actions
which it would be profitable for some manufacturer(s) or reseller(s)
(including new firms) to take. It is necessary for Bork to assume that
there are no barriers to the entry of new firms, and that consumers (or
enough of them) would be largely indifferent as between the estab-
lished price-maintained brands and new brands introduced by new or
existing firms. In other words, Bork assumes that new competition
would protect consumers against the actions of manufacturers who
restricted output, intentionally or otherwise, by practicing r.p.m.
We agree that where entry is easy and where brand preferences are
weak there is little danger that r.p.m. could operate against the inter-
ests of consumers. But these conditions do not prevail in all markets.
Nor does Bork himself seem to believe that these conditions apply
generally. For if he did hold such a view, he would not have found it
necessary, as he does, to distinguish in his policy prescriptions betwveen
cartel-organized r.p.m. and r.p.m. by individual manufacturers in the
absence of cartel arrangements.7 Entry of new firms and new brands
would counteract output restrictions whether practised by cartels or by
firms individually. Indeed, there would be no need for any antitrust or
monopoly policy whatsoever if no firm or collection of firms had power
to affect output and prices, or if such power was negligible or ephem-
eral because of the ease with which new firms could establish them-
selves as competitors.
their frst task should be to ask whether these varieties can be segregated and handled
differently at an enforcement cost which is justified by the benefits. If not, their
second task should be to estimate whether on balance consumers would be benefited
by outlawing all manufacturer-desired r.p.m. or none. [They] ... do not appear to
have built this bridge between their objections to my thesis and their suggested public
policy.
6. Gould & Yamey, supra note 2, at 730.
7. Bork, supra note 3, esp. at 474-75.
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I.
In the first section of our Note we presented four counter-examples
(with a fifth in footnote 6) to refute Bork's thesis that r.p.m. is neces-
sarily output-increasing. Bork takes issue with each of these.
His discussion of our first counter-example calls for the longest com-
ment. We postulated a situation in which a manufacturer of the
branded good could increase the demand for it either by r.p.m. or by an
advertising campaign. We showed that r.p.m. could be the more
profitable of the two courses even when the number of units sold was
smaller than with the alternative course of action and concluded that
r.p.m. could lead to a reduction in output. Bork says our analysis is
fallacious and also that in any case "output" has not been reduced in
the postulated circumstances. We deal with these two points in reverse
order.
Notwithstanding his objection to our counter-example, Bork never-
theless concedes in his Reply that r.p.m. may reduce sales (presumably,
that is, number of units sold) as compared with other methods of
distribution. But this retreat is swiftly followed by a counter-attack:
It does not follow, however, that output is lower or prices higher.
The composition of the product has changed .... But if the new
product proves more profitable it means that consumers prefer the
new allocation of resources. That in turn means the output of the
economy has increased.8
We must say at once that our counter-examples assumed that "out-
put" in Bork's original article meant number of units of the product
sold-we believe that many readers must have put the same interpreta-
tion on the word. But even if "output" refers to the "output of the
economy," we are at a loss to know from where Bork derives the propo-
sition quoted in the preceding paragraph. No one, so far as we are
aware, has demonstrated rigorously that promotional activities which
increase a manufacturer's profit necessarily lead to an improvement in
the allocation of resources. Certainly Bork's argument, or rather asser-
tion, does not attain the necessary standards of rigor.
There are, indeed, good reasons why students of welfare theory have
been able to say so little about the welfare effects of promotional activ-
ity. Such activities involve attempts to induce the consumer to change
his preferences and tastes. Students of welfare economics have, how-
ever, generally been forced to confine their analyses to examination of
8. Bork, supra note 1, at 738-34.
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the effects of such things as different taxes, industrial structures or
trade practices on consumers with given tastes. This is because it is felt
permissible to say that if a consumer with given tastes prefers one col-
lection of goods which is not available to him to another which is, his
welfare is increased if the change under consideration enables him to
have the former rather than the latter. When tastes can be assumed to
remain constant we have a stable yardstick against which to appraise
alternatives. But if, for example, the trade practice not only changes
the collections of goods available to the consumer, but also simulta-
neously changes the consumer's ranking of those collections, we have
no such stable yardstick with which to appraise the effects.,
We do not mean to suggest that it is in principle impossible to discuss
the welfare effects of promotional activities. Rather, our purpose in the
foregoing discussion has been to show why, in terms of standard welfare
economic analysis, little can be said about their effects, and, in partic-
ular, why we believe the proposition that promotional activities which
are profitable to the entrepreneur necessarily improve the allocation of
resources has not, and indeed probably cannot, be derived from stan-
dard welfare economics. Bork relies on standard welfare economics;
and he has not demonstrated the validity of his proposition.10
We turn now to Bork's criticism of our analysis in the first counter-
example. We postulated an advertising campaign the costs of which are
a fixed cost for the purpose of output determination because they do
not enter the relevant marginal cost schedule or curve. Bork says the
advertising costs are "dearly classifiable as marginal" because the "man-
ufacturer hypothesized by Gould and Yamey is certainly not faced with
a stated and invariable expense for his advertising."" His argument that
the costs should be dassified as marginal costs is misconceived. It is true
that the costs of different kinds and intensities of advertising campaigns
vary, as do their probable effects on the demand for the advertised
9. Similar difficulties arise with promotional activities that involve no more than the
use of resources to provide information to consumers. For example, can we have the same
ranking function to compare two situations when one of them includes goods which the
consumer previously did not know about?
10. Bork's reliance on standard welfare economics is evident from his statement that
a cartel entails misallocation of resources insofar as it "creates or increases a divergence
between price and marginal cost... ." Bork, supra note 1, at 734 n.4. At this juncture we
need point out only that Bork does not (and, we believe, cannot) demonstrate that profit-
able promotional activity cannot increase the gap between price and marginal cost (as
compared with the gap in the alternative situation without the particular promotional
activity). Furthermore, while our first counter-example is so specified that the divergence
of price from marginal cost is lower with r.p.m. than without it, the opposite is true of
the counter-example outlined in our footnote 6 (Gould & Yamey, supra note 2, at 724 n.6)
and of the other counter-examples also.
11. Bork, supra note 1, at 733.
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product. Comparison ex ante of the costs and returns for the various
campaigns contemplated is necessary for deciding which campaign is
likely to be the most profitable. But our problem was to compare the
profit-maximising outputs associated with the two alternative strategies,
an adverstising campaign and r.p.m. For this purpose it is proper to as-
sume that the best advertising campaign has been selected, and to
derive the profit-maximising output, taking the advertising expenditure
as given. Now the relevant data for output determination are variations
in revenue (marginal revenue) and variations in costs (marginal costs)
with respect to changes in output. Clearly, in this context the ad-
vertising expenditure on the chosen campaign is a fixed cost because it
does not vary with output and does not affect the marginal cost curve.
Similarly, when we consider the r.p.m. strategy it is proper to assume
that the best retail margin has been selected. However, now when we
analyse the profit-maximising output, the increment in the retail mar-
gin (as against the competitive retail margin) must be added to the
marginal cost curve (or, equivalently, deducted from the marginal
revenue curve).
The reason for conducting the analysis in this way is that, having
hypothesized that each of the two strategies has the same effect on the
demand curve, we are in a position to compare their profit-maximising
outputs. The marginal revenue and marginal costs of production are
the same for both strategies; r.p.m. raises the marginal cost curve but
the postulated advertising does not; therefore r.p.m. will result in the
smaller output, although it may well be the more profitable strategy.
Bork misconceives the nature and purpose of the distinction between
fixed and variable costs when he says advertising is not a fixed cost
because the manufacturer is not faced with a "stated and invariable
expense." The costs of buildings or plant are a matter of choice at the
planning stage, yet they are fixed costs for the purpose of output deter-
mination once the buildings or plant has been chosen. Similarly, in our
example, advertising costs are fixed with respect to output.1 2
Bork's comments 3 on our second and third counter-examples do not
12. It is not difficult to think of types of advertising outlays which arc not fixed costs
for purposes of price determination. Some outlays vary with output, for example where ad-
vertsing material is included on or in each packet of the product. But the fact that another
type of advertising outlay does not give rise to a fixed cost does not, of course, invalidate
our counter-example.
It was in the interests of simplified exposition that advertising was assumed to be a
fixed cost in our example. The particular result, however, does not depend upon this
assumption. The example could be modified to accommodate the situation in which the
most profitable advertising program had both fixed and variable cost elements, and yet
would give the same result.
13. Bork, supra note 1, at 734-37.
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require a detailed reply from us. They rely heavily on the assumption
that the entry of new firms and the acceptance by consumers of new
brands occur without any difficulty, and this assumption has already
been examined. All we need add specifically is that in our third counter-
example the key point is that a larger reseller is generally more easily
able to promote a new brand than is a smaller reseller. We do assume,
as Bork rightly says,14 the possibility of entry: but this is not the same
thing as saying that entry is easy and that the established manufacturer
has no room for maneuver.
Our fourth counter-example refers to the use of r.p.m. to remove one
source of instability in the market shares of oligopolist manufacturers
-the instability that derives not from any action of the manufacturers
but from the price competition of resellers. Bork counters by pointing
out that since r.p.m. will encourage resellers' competition in the form
of the supply of services, instability will persist. Two points are in
order. First, reseller competition in supplying consumer services
changes consumers' shopping behavior vastly more slowly than price
competition. It therefore disturbs market shares of rival brands less
than does price competition. This applies not only to the long run but
also, and even more so, to the short run; and the instability referred to
in our counter-example is primarily short-run instability. That service
competition is less disturbing and acts far more slowly than price com-
petition has been well recognized by retailer supporters of r.p.m. (and,
indeed, by participants in all kinds of collective arrangements to re-
strain price competition). Second, if reseller competition is channelled
into services in a situation where each reseller typically sells a number
of rival brands within the same product-group, the gains in sales of the
successful resellers and the losses of the unsuccessful will tend to be
spread unselectively over all brands, and to that extent brand market
shares will be left largely undisturbed. In contrast, if reseller competi-
tion is allowed to take the form of price competition, it is unlikely that
any reseller in adjusting his prices to increase total sales will so contrive
matters that his proportionate sales of each brand remain unchanged.
Moreover, should the initiator of a particular bout of price competi-
tion favor the sales of one brand, the competitive responses of affected
resellers might well serve to favor its sales still further. In short, while
we agree that r.p.m. does not eliminate all instability originating at the
reseller level, we contend that r.p.m. reduces the degree of instability.
(Bork's further point that r.p.m. is an expensive way of adieving this
14. Id. 735.
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particular objective applies equally to other objectives, such as in-
creasing the number of outlets or increasing "output" in any other way.
The fact that r.p.m. has a cost is important; it does not mean, however,
that therefore its use cannot be profitable.)
Bork argues further that our fourth counter-example contradicts our
expressed agreement with him that r.p.m. is unlikely to be valuable as
an aid in the policing of a manufacturers' cartel arrangement. We do
not think we have been inconsistent, since we understood "policing"
to mean the detection of secret price-cutting by manufacturers. If "po-
licing" is to cover anything that contributes towards the maintenance
of an effective manufacturers' agreement or noncollusive "understand-
ing" about prices, then we withdraw our earlier expression of accep-
tance of Bork's view.
Bork concludes Section I of his Reply by saying that our counter-
examples "do not . . .withstand analysis."15 We conclude, on the
contrary, that they survive the battery of criticism which Bork has
directed at them.
II.
Professor Bork begins Section II of his Reply by saying that we ad-
vanced "four arguments to support the propriety of judicial supervision
of r.p.m. even where it is practiced with the purpose of creating effi-
ciency."' 16 Bork, 'however, is mistaken. We were concerned with his
particular argument (largely by way of analogy) in support of his prop-
osition that judicial supervision should not be allowed. Judicial super-
vision may be unwise or inexpedient even if, as we suggested, Bork's
particular argument is incorrect. In the discussion we also considered
related policy issues ignored or neglected by Bork. But even if we had
advocated judicial supervision of r.p.m. (i.e., that the courts be required
to "ratify or reject" r.p.m. in particular cases), this would not have war-
ranted the inference that it "would turn the antitrust laws into a
mandate for the judiciary, of all inconceivable institutions, to manage
the now private sector of the economy."'17 We pointed out that manage-
ment decisions to have r.p.m. (and similar restrictive practices) differ
from management decisions concerning, say, investment and inventory
15. Id. 738.
16. Id. Bork fails to notice that he attributes to us two contradictory policy prescrlp-
tions-we are supposed to have recommended the complete abolition of r.p.m., and also
the judicial control of the use of r.pam.
17. Id. 739.
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levels precisely because the former directly restrain reseller competi-
tion and affect other firms' freedom of decision, while the latter do not
have these implications. The false analogy between the two types of
decisions has continued to mislead Bork.
We do not think it fruitful to explore further the propriety of judi-
cial supervision. Instead, we move on to a different but related matter.
We called attention to the apparent inconsistency in Bork's position
in that he opposes the supervision of manufacturers' marketing policies
by the judiciary but supports r.p.m. which amounts to the supervision
of resellers' price policies by manufacturers. Bork's justification of the
latter position is that the manufacturer may see advantages for himself
in a particular form of distribution which may not be best for all re-
sellers. He concludes that the interests of each reseller are "parochial"
and that the manufacturer's "more general judgment should prevail."18
Bork's policy conclusion requires the premise that the manufacturer
will adopt r.p.m. if, and only if, it serves to increase "output" and
thereby to promote economic welfare. This premise we have already
discussed above; but since it is central to Bork's thesis, we do not think
it is superfluous to take another look at it, but from a different angle.
The discussion that follows bears on Borks "general" vs. "parochial"
dichotomy and introduces a consideration not specifically taken into
account in Section I of our previous paper nor in Section I of the
present paper.
It is implicit in Bork's analysis that the manufacturer considers all
the favorable and unfavorable effects on the welfare of consumers of
his decision for r.p.m. because these effects have correspondingly favor-
able or unfavorable effects on his profits. If the increase in consumer
welfare exceeds the reduction in consumer welfare (the latter due to
the inability of each reseller to adjust optimally to the situation of his
18. Id. As regards the question of the knowledge possessed by the manufacturer and
and resellers, respectively, we merely wish to draw attention to the prima fade presump-
tion-which forms part of the traditional case for a private-enterprise economy-that the
independent entrepreneur knows more about his own resources and his "local" circum-
stances and opportunities than anyone else. The overriding of his decisions by some other
entrepreneur must involve a "loss" to the economy of the value of some relevant informa-
tion, itself a scarce resource.
The argument used by Bork that r.pm. does no more than the manufacturer could do
by vertical integration into the reselling trade is inappropriate. The vertically integrated
manufacturer-reseller is an entrepreneur in manufacturing and also in reslling and the
prima fade presumption in favor of the wisdom of his decisions pertains to each of the
two activities. The same does not apply in respect of reselling in the case of the non-
integrated manufacturer who practices r.pm.
It may be noted also that the consideration discussed in the text (p. 942 supra)
does not apply to the vertically integrated manufacturer-reseller to the extent that his
policies in marketing his manufactured goods adversely affect his sales, as reeller, of other
goods. Some, at least, of the effects which are external to (and hence ignored by) the non-
integrated manufacturer are internal to the vertically integrated manufacturer-reseller.
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"parochial" consumers), then, it is implied, the manufacturer's profits
will be greater, and conversely.
This reasoning, however, is erroneous insofar as it relies on a coinci.
dence of the interests of the individual manufacturer and of those of
consumers of goods in general. The manufacturer is concerned only
with his gains and losses from r.p.m. He is not concerned, for example,
with welfare losses to consumers arising from the effect of his r.p.m.
decision on the terms on which other goods are offered by resellers,
since these losses do not affect his profits (except to the limited extent
that they may in turn affect the sales of his goods). In this sense the
manufacturer's interests are "parochial." Bork's general proposition
is invalid if the adverse welfare effects caused by the manufacturer but
not reflected in his profits are admitted into the analysis.
Such effects could be ignored-as they would be zero-if each re-
seller handled only the goods of the manufacturer in question and
nothing else. Resellers, however, typically sell a range of goods and
brands from a number of suppliers. Consumers' demands for resellers'
offerings are interdependent, and the resellers' costs of supplying indi-
vidual goods are also interdependent. The inability of a reseller to offer
a brand at a competitively attractive price may adversely affect his busi-
ness as a whole and hence the terms on which he supplies other goods.
It may reduce the number of consumers he can attract and the volume
of his business and increase the costs of his operations. It may also
affect his rate of growth, with adverse effects on his future costs and the
prices he charges for other goods. Of course, r.p.m. in respect of an
unimportant brand is unlikely to have much, if anything, in the way
of these side effects. The likelihood of substantial adverse side effects
increases with the importance and with the number of brands subject
to r.p.m. and, even more, with the pervasiveness of r.p.m. generally in
relation to the ranges of goods which can profitably be offered together
by resellers. These effects, which are side effects from the individual
manufacturer's point of view, are among those which students of r,pam,
consider when they examine the effects of the practice on the organiza-
tion and performance of the distributive trades.19
19. In the discussion above we have referred only to the adverse side-effects of r.p.m.
which would not enter into the individual manufacturer's calculations. There may be
favorable side-effects, which similarly would not enter into these calculations. For example,
for some resellers the optimal adjustment to r.p.m. might include the reduction of the
prices of some other goods. Such favorable side-effects would almost certainly not out-
weigh the unfavorable. (According to Bork, supra note 1, at 731, the price-maintaining
manufacturer gives the reseller an additional margin in order to buy from him "Increased
activity" such as promotional activity, presumably in respect of the manufacturer's own
brands. To the extent that resellers use the additional margin to cut prices of other goods
or.to provide services in respect of other goods, the manufacturer derives less benefit from
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We conclude this Section with an apology to Professor Bork and the
reader for a mistake in the concluding paragraph of Section II of our
earlier paper.20 We perpetrated a non sequitur by saying, inexcusably,
that because some manufacturers have wrongly predicted the effect on
their sales of the removal of r.p.m., therefore all manufacturers gen-
erally have been wrong. A weaker conclusion should properly have
followed. This does not, however, destroy our argument, which re-
quires no more than that some manufacturers have been mistaken and
others are likely to be mistaken. We may point out, also, that Bork's
reference to businessmen who would like to repeat their "mistake" of
having r.p.m. does not prove that their motivation is the promotion of
"efficiency": the analysis in our original Section I demonstrates that
there are other motivations.
III.
We turn now to the relation between criteria for economic policy
and theoretical welfare economics. First, we must distinguish two areas
in which the criteria are to apply: (I) in the formulation of antitrust
policy; and (2) in supplying the courts (or other implementing agency)
with operational rules.
With regard to (2), we are all for as much simplicity and clarity as
possible. Bork misunderstands our position when he says that we criti-
cised his criterion-the effect on output-for being "too simple."2' If
there had to be rules, we would prefer rules to be of the kind "consider
whether output in this industry will be increased by r.p.m." rather
than of the kind "consider whether resource allocation in the economy
as a whole would be improved by r.p.m. in this industry." However,
since Bork's main thesis is the legitimacy of r.p.m. in the absence of
cartels, he is concerned with rules of type (2) only in requiring the
courts to determine whether cartelization is present.
Bork's main concern is with criteria of type (1). In advocating policy
one must, of necessity, make do with what theoretical and empirical
knowledge is available. We may bemoan our incomplete knowledge,
but we shall wait forever if we wait on complete knowledge before
tackling practical questions. We have no objection to someone's setting
his r.pam.) For our purposes it is enough that it is possible, and sometimes virtually
certain, that the net adverse side-effects on "welfare" outweigh the postulated increase in
"efficiency" created by r.pm.
20. Gould & Yamey, supra note 2, at 728.
21. Bork, supra note 1, at 740.
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up simplified criteria, provided he attempts to justify them on the basis
of available knowledge and also, from the same source, points out the
shortcomings. Our criticism was that Bork essayed the first (although
unsuccessfully), but not the second.
We cannot help but feel that Bork's discussion of his criterion is
obscure, not only to ourselves, but also to many other readers. As we
said above, in our original Note we assumed that Bork's simplified
criterion was "effects on output" (in the straightforward sense of num-
ber of units sold by the firm) and that he had attempted to justify this
criterion in terms of the general-equilibrium welfare economics theo-
rems of resource allocation. We suggested that this justification was
erroneous. We should explain that although Bork's "output" criterion
is ill-founded in general-equilibrium theory, we did not for that reason
judge it to be a bad criterion if "output" referred to the output of the
particular activity and not to that of the economy as a whole. Indeed,
we have rather more sympathy for this type of approach, which is
related to the appraisal of effects of r.p.m. in a particular case on the
consumers immediately affected, rather than one which attempts to
evaluate its effects on the economy as a whole.
It is now clear, especially from footnote 4 in Bork's Reply, that he
rests his case directly on general equilibrium theory. We can paraphrase
his position in the following way: "A trade practice is judged harmful
if it reduces the output of the whole economy. Practices which increase
the divergence between price and marginal cost reduce the output of
the economy." Bork's main contention then becomes: "R.p.m. always
decreases (or else leaves unchanged) the divergence between price and
marginal cost." He does not establish this last proposition. The nearest
he gets to a justification is to assert that since some manufacturers find
r.p.m. an "efficient," i.e., a profitable, means of distribution, it must
increase the output of the economy. In fact there is no obvious reason
to suppose that r.p.m. entails a narrowing of the gap between price and
marginal cost: the practice may affect the manufacturer's rate of out-
put, the demand for the good and the marginal costs of the manu-
facturer and of resellers, and it is possible to conceive of cases in which
the practice increases, and cases in which it decreases, the divergence
between price and marginal cost.
Even had Bork succeeded in establishing his proposition, the restric-
tive assumptions underpinning the resource-allocation theorems re-
lating price and marginal cost should be made clear before policy
conclusions are derived. Bork is right in suggesting that behind our
admittedly somewhat cryptic remarks, we had in mind such considera-
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tions as effects on the distribution of income and the theory of second
best. In addition, we had in mind that these theorems are derived from
static equilibrium theory (and do not apply, for example, to situations
in which technical knowledge and consumer preferences are not static),
that the "static" considerations should be supplemented by "dynamic"
considerations such as the effect on innovation mentioned by us in our
Note, and that externalities introduced complications. We refrained
from detailed discussion of the implications of income distribution and
the theory of second best; but since Bork has put the matter at issue in
his Reply, we take the opportunity to comment on his discussion.
Bork's treatment of the topic of income distribution is peculiar. He
suggests that antitrust law and the courts could not deal with effects on
the distribution of income because this would require tracing the ef-
fects of a practice throughout the whole economy. We think lawyers
will appreciate that a substantial part of the law concerns itself pre-
cisely with the question of income distribution. For example, the con-
cept of "damages" is concerned with the losses a wronged party has
suffered. The courts are familiar with, and expert at, this kind of prob-
lem. Moreover, we would suggest that a major consideration in the
minds of policy-makers over the centuries has been that monopoly and
restrictive practices enriched the supplier at the expense of his cus-
tomers. Antitrust policy-makers can, should and do concern themselves
with income distribution, although as a practical matter they, and the
courts, do not concern themselves with every last ripple of effect on
incomes in every part of the economy. We agree that decisions about
the pattern of income distribution are policy decisions properly within
the province of the legislature. But the instruments which legislatures
use to implement their decisions are not only taxes and subsidies, but
also laws concerning practices, including restrictive practices,- which
affect the distribution of income.
We come now to the theorems of resource allocation, and in par-
ticular to the implications for them of the theory of second best. A
central theorem of welfare economics is that if the whole economy is
composed of perfectly competitive industries (and given certain other
conditions which are not relevant to the present discussion), the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for a welfare maximum are met. From
this result it is tempting to conclude that if we have an economy which
is perfectly competitive except for two industries which are monopo-
lized, we necessarily shall increase welfare by inducing one of the
22. And indeed criminal practices such as theft and forgery.
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monopolists to produce at the competitive level of output. But this
conclusion is false, since although we have equalized values of marginal
products as between the first monopolist and the competitive indus-
tries, the factors required for this expansion of output may well have
come from the second monopolist, where the values of their marginal
products may have been higher. More generally, according to the
theory of second best, if we cannot remove all divergencies from perfect
competition, we cannot say that removing some of them will necessarily
increase welfare.
Bork says in his Reply that in order to apply the theory of second
best a court would need to have a vast amount of empirical information
about the economy (and, we might add, a vast computational ability).
This task, he believes, the courts could not perform. We do not dis-
agree. What Bork fails to realize, however, are the consequences of the
theory of second best for the theorems on which he believes his crite-
rion is based. We have already shown that Bork has not established
that profitable r.p.m. necessarily will narrow the discrepancy between
price and marginal cost. The theory of second best tells us that even
if Bork had established or could establish that the discrepancy would
necessarily be reduced, we would be none the wiser: in terms of welfare
economics we would still not know the direction in which welfare had
changed as a result of the postulated narrowing of the discrepancy.
The theory of second best has important implications for economic
policy-for if we acknowledge that we live in a world where all ele-
ments of monopoly power cannot possibly be eradicated (and govern-
ment intervention through taxes and subsidies has the same kind of
effect), we must also acknowledge that simple rules, such as that price
should equal marginal cost, do not have secure theoretical underpin-
nings in welfare economics. Indeed, the present state of welfare eco-
nomics is such that it is extremely doubtful whether there are any
general and simple rules deducible from welfare economics which
provide practical help for economic policy insofar as economic policy
is concerned with optimal resource allocation throughout the economy.
In summary, our views on the theoretical foundations for economic
policy, in particular as related to antitrust, differ greatly from Bork's.
We think policy-makers should concern themselves, among other
things, with the effects of, say, restrictive practices on income distribu-
tion. We believe, further, that the resource-allocation theorems of neo-
classical welfare economics offer no secure foundation for policy and
certainly cannot serve as its basis. We believe, however, that there
are some simpler and more familiar arguments which support a pre-
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sumption against restraints on competition-for example, that compe-
tition is a spur to efficiency in the use of resources within firms and
industries, that competition promotes experiment and innovation, and
that restraints on competition tend to raise prices and to restrict con-
sumer choice. There is no doubt a variety of ways in which the pre-
sumption may be given effect in the form of specific policy measures,
with a variety of roles for the courts to play. But it is not, and was not,
our purpose to go into these wider issues.
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